Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
For the past decade, security experts have warned that malicious engineers could modify hardware designs to include hardware backdoors (trojans), which, in turn, could grant attackers full control over a system. Proposed defenses to detect these attacks have been outpaced by the development of increasingly small, but equally dangerous, trojans. To thwart trojan-based attacks, we propose a novel architecture that maps the security-critical portions of a processor design to a one-time programmable, LUT-free fabric. The programmable fabric is automatically generated by analyzing the HDL of targeted modules. We present our tools to generate the fabric and map functionally equivalent designs onto the fabric. By having a trusted party randomly select a mapping and configure each chip, we prevent an attacker from knowing the physical location of targeted signals at manufacturing time. In addition, we provide decoy options (canaries) for the mapping of security-critical signals, such that hardware trojans hitting a decoy are thwarted and exposed. Using this defense approach, any trojan capable of analyzing the entire configurable fabric must employ complex logic functions with a large silicon footprint, thus exposing it to detection by inspection. We evaluated our solution on a RISC-V BOOM processor and demonstrated that, by providing the ability to map each critical signal to 6 distinct locations on the chip, we can reduce the chance of attack success by an undetectable trojan by 99%, incurring only a 27% area overhead.
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Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2018 | 10.1145/3240765.3240854 | ICCAD-IEEE ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
attack success,undetectable trojan,mitigating hardware trojans,security experts,malicious engineers,hardware designs,hardware back-doors,trojan-based attacks,security-critical portions,processor design,LUT-free fabric,programmable fabric,targeted modules,map functionally equivalent designs,targeted signals,manufacturing time,decoy options,security-critical signals,defense approach,entire configurable fabric,complex logic functions | Hardware security module,Decoy,Computer science,Chip,Design methods,Processor design,Footprint,Trojan,Computer hardware,Boom | Conference |
ISSN | ISBN | Citations |
1933-7760 | 978-1-4503-5950-4 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 10 | 4 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timothy Linscott | 1 | 0 | 0.34 |
| Pete Ehrett | 2 | 0 | 1.35 |
| Valeria Bertacco | 3 | 1365 | 86.93 |
| Todd M. Austin | 4 | 38 | 4.71 |