Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
The charity sector is assuming a central role in many countries, due to a generalized increase in wealth inequalities and the restructuring of the welfare state. This market, however, exhibits inefficiencies. In this work, we empirically test the adoption of a centralized truthful allocation mechanism without money to charities bidding for donations. Our results show that it is indeed possible to improve the income of the sector by at least 50% on average. We further show how the application of proxy bidding allows to maintain a significant portion of the welfare improvements without the need of many bids. Our results pave the way for a novel and more profitable model of distribution of donated goods. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2019 | 10.5555/3306127.3331960 | adaptive agents and multi-agents systems |
Field | DocType | Citations |
Computer science,Combinatorial auction,Microeconomics,Inequality,Proxy bid,Welfare state,Welfare,Bidding,Restructuring,Distributed computing | Conference | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 0 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Christopher Culley | 1 | 0 | 0.34 |
| Ji Qi | 2 | 50 | 10.17 |
| Carmine Ventre | 3 | 181 | 24.54 |