Paper Info
Title
More Secure Collaborative APIs Resistant to Flush+Reload and Flush+Flush Attacks on ARMv8-A
Abstract
With the popularity of smart devices such as mobile phones and tablets, the security problem of the widely used ARMv8-A processor has received more and more attention. Flush+Reload and Flush+Flush cache attacks have become two of the most important security threats due to their low noise and high resolution. In order to resist Flush+Reload and Flush+Flush attacks, researchers proposed many defense methods. However, these existing methods have various shortcomings. The runtime defense methods using hardware performance counters cannot detect attacks fast enough, effectively detect Flush+Flush or avoid a high false positive rate. Static code analysis schemes are powerless for obfuscation techniques. The approaches of permanently reducing the resolution can only be utilized on browser products and cannot be applied in the system. In this paper, we design two more secure collaborative APIs-flush operation API and high resolution time API-which can resist Flush+Reload and Flush+Flush attacks. When the flush operation API is called, the high resolution time API temporarily reduces its resolution and automatically restores. Moreover, the flush operation API also has the ability to detect and handle suspected Flush+Reload and Flush+Flush attacks. The attack and performance comparison experiments prove that the two APIs we designed are safer and the performance losses are acceptable.
Year
DOI
Venue
2019
10.1109/APSEC48747.2019.00062
2019 26th Asia-Pacific Software Engineering Conference (APSEC)
Keywords
Field
DocType
Flush+Reload attack, Flush+Flush attack, Collabo rative API, ARMv8 A
Static program analysis,Computer science,Cache,SAFER,Real-time computing,Low noise,Obfuscation,Embedded system
Conference
ISSN
ISBN
Citations 
1530-1362
978-1-7281-4649-2
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
11
5
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Jingquan Ge102.37
Neng Gao216.44
Chenyang Tu306.08
Ji Xiang43311.84
Zeyi Liu503.04