Paper Info
Title
Representing pure Nash equilibria in argumentation
Abstract
In this paper we describe an argumentation-based representation of normal form games, and demonstrate how argumentation can be used to compute pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our approach builds on Modgil's Extended Argumentation Frameworks. We demonstrate its correctness, showprove several theoretical properties it satisfies, and outline how it can be used to explain why certain strategies are Nash equilibria to a non-expert human user.
Year
DOI
Venue
2022
10.3233/AAC-210007
ARGUMENT & COMPUTATION
Keywords
DocType
Volume
Argumentation, game theory, Nash equilibrium, pure strategy
Journal
13
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
2
1946-2166
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
0
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Bruno Yun1105.31
Srdjan Vesic220718.15
Nir Oren300.68