Title
Robust Secure Shield Architecture for Detection and Protection Against Invasive Attacks
Abstract
Invasive attacks, such as microprobing or focused-ion-beam (FIB) circuit editing are serious threats to security-related semiconductors. To ensure that there is security against invasive attacks, an effective countermeasure is to use a protective layer as a secure shield. Previous secure shield methods can be classified into one of two categories; detection circuits based on the delay difference or block ciphers. For the former, timing asymmetries caused by the capacitance of the probe are detected. The main drawback of this method is that it is highly vulnerable to chip editing by FIB equipment. FIB circuit editing can easily cripple the detection circuits of the secure shield. In contrast, the cryptographically secure shield based on the block cipher can provide strong protection against FIB circuit editing. However, it is prone to microprobing attacks because of its inability to detect the capacitance load of the probe. In this article, we propose a robust secure shield architecture against invasive attacks, including both probe attempts and the FIB circuit editing. The proposed method is based on the detection circuits with low hardware overhead and fast-analysis time and includes protection circuits to prevent information from being leaked.
Year
DOI
Venue
2020
10.1109/TCAD.2019.2944580
IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
Keywords
DocType
Volume
Metals,Probes,Hardware,Capacitance,Wires,Multiplexing,Security
Journal
39
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
10
0278-0070
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
0
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Young Woo Lee195.76
Hyeonchan Lim200.34
Youngkwang Lee300.68
Sungho Kang443678.44