Paper Info
Title
Committing To Quantum Resistance, Better: A Speed-And-Risk-Configurable Defence For Bitcoin Against A Fast Quantum Computing Attack
Abstract
In light of the emerging threat of powerful quantum computers appearing in the near future, we investigate the potential attacks on Bitcoin available to a quantum-capable adversary. In particular, we illustrate how Shor's quantum algorithm can be used to forge ECDSA based signatures, allowing attackers to hijack transactions. We then propose a simple commit-delay-reveal protocol, which allows users to securelymove their funds from non-quantum-resistant outputs to those adhering to a quantum-resistant digital signature scheme. In a previous paper (Stewart et al. R. Soc. Open Sci. 5(6), 180410 (2018)) [1] we presented a similar scheme with a long fixed delay. Here we improve on our previous work, by allowing each user to choose their preferred delay-long for a low risk of attack, or short if a higher risk is acceptable to that user. As before, our scheme requires modifications to the Bitcoin protocol, but once again these can be implemented as a soft fork.
Year
DOI
Venue
2019
10.1007/978-3-030-37110-4_9
MATHEMATICAL RESEARCH FOR BLOCKCHAIN ECONOMY, MARBLE 2019
DocType
Volume
ISSN
Conference
2020
2198-7246
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
0
0.34
0
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Dragos Ioan Ilie100.34
William J. Knottenbelt257150.07
Iain D. Stewart300.34