Abstract | ||
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In both economic and evolutionary theories of games, two general classes of evolution can be identified: 1) dynamics based on myopic optimization and 2) dynamics based on imitations or replications. The collective behavior of structured populations governed by these dynamics can vary significantly. Particularly in social dilemmas, myopic optimizations typically lead to Nash equilibrium payoffs tha... |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2021 | 10.1109/TCNS.2021.3065655 | IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
Games,Convergence,Optimization,Economics,Production,Nash equilibrium,Control systems | Journal | 8 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
3 | 2325-5870 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 0 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Alain Govaert | 1 | 0 | 0.34 |
Pouria Ramazi | 2 | 0 | 0.34 |
Ming Cao | 3 | 2343 | 249.61 |