Title
Rationality, Imitation, and Rational Imitation in Spatial Public Goods Games
Abstract
In both economic and evolutionary theories of games, two general classes of evolution can be identified: 1) dynamics based on myopic optimization and 2) dynamics based on imitations or replications. The collective behavior of structured populations governed by these dynamics can vary significantly. Particularly in social dilemmas, myopic optimizations typically lead to Nash equilibrium payoffs tha...
Year
DOI
Venue
2021
10.1109/TCNS.2021.3065655
IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems
Keywords
DocType
Volume
Games,Convergence,Optimization,Economics,Production,Nash equilibrium,Control systems
Journal
8
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
3
2325-5870
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
0
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Alain Govaert100.34
Pouria Ramazi200.34
Ming Cao32343249.61