Name
Title | ||
|---|---|---|
How to split the costs and charge the travellers sharing a ride? aligning system’s optimum with users’ equilibrium |
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
•Forming stable groups for users sharing rides can lead to suboptimal results•We model the problem as a game, where strategies are groups to share the ride with•No sharing is Nash Equilibrium. Whether a Strong Equilibrium exists is NP-Complete•We define three equilibrium notions, stronger than Nash and weaker than Strong•We propose cost-sharing protocols that make optimal solutions also equilibria |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2022 | 10.1016/j.ejor.2021.11.041 | European Journal of Operational Research |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
Transportation,Ridepooling,Cost-sharing,Price of stability,Set cover | Journal | 301 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
3 | 0377-2217 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 6 | 4 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| A Fielbaum | 1 | 0 | 0.34 |
| R Kucharski | 2 | 0 | 0.34 |
| O Cats | 3 | 0 | 0.34 |
| Javier Alonso-Mora | 4 | 375 | 34.15 |