Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
When an iPhone is turned off, most wireless chips stay on. For instance, upon user-initiated shutdown, the iPhone remains locatable via the Find My network. If the battery runs low, the iPhone shuts down automatically and enters a power reserve mode. Yet, users can still access credit cards, student passes, and other items in their Wallet. We analyze how Apple implements these standalone wireless features, working while iOS is not running, and determine their security boundaries. On recent iPhones, Bluetooth, Near Field Communication (NFC), and Ultra-wideband (UWB) keep running after power off, and all three wireless chips have direct access to the secure element. As a practical example what this means to security, we demonstrate the possibility to load malware onto a Bluetooth chip that is executed while the iPhone is off. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2022 | 10.1145/3507657.3528547 | Wireless Network Security (WISEC) |
DocType | ISSN | Citations |
Conference | WiSec 2022: Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Security and
Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 0 | 4 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jiska Classen | 1 | 33 | 9.10 |
| Alexander Heinrich | 2 | 0 | 0.68 |
| Robert Reith | 3 | 0 | 0.34 |
| Matthias Hollick | 4 | 750 | 97.29 |