Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
The development of cyber-physical systems (CPS) has brought much attention of researchers to cyber-attack and cyber-security. A sensor attacker targeting on a supervised discrete event system can modify a set of sensor readings and cause the closed-loop system to reach undesirable states. In this letter, we propose a new attack detection mechanism under which the supervisor only needs to keep track of the last observable event received. Given a plant and a supervisor enforcing a state specification, we define a sensor attacker threatening if it may cause the closed-loop system to enter a forbidden state. Our goal is to verify whether there exists such a threatening sensor attacker for a given controlled system. A new structure, called All Sensor Attack (ASA), is proposed to capture all possible sensor attacks launched by the attacker. Based on the ASA automaton, a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a stealthy threatening sensor attacker is presented. Finally, we show that the condition can be verified in polynomial time. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2022 | 10.1109/LCSYS.2022.3163467 | IEEE CONTROL SYSTEMS LETTERS |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
Closed loop systems, Automata, Actuators, Complexity theory, Discrete-event systems, Supervisory control, Controllability, Discrete event systems, cyber-physical systems, sensor attack | Journal | 6 |
ISSN | Citations | PageRank |
2475-1456 | 0 | 0.34 |
References | Authors | |
0 | 3 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Yin Tong | 1 | 0 | 1.69 |
| Yucheng Wang | 2 | 0 | 0.34 |
| Alessandro Giua | 3 | 1836 | 199.57 |