Paper Info
Title
Poster: The Unintended Consequences of Algorithm Agility in DNSSEC
Abstract
ABSTRACTCryptographic algorithm agility is an important property for DNSSEC: it allows easy deployment of new algorithms if the existing ones are no longer secure. In this work we show that the cryptographic agility in DNSSEC, although critical for provisioning DNS with strong cryptography, also introduces a vulnerability. We find that under certain conditions, when new algorithms are listed in signed DNS responses, the resolvers do not validate DNSSEC. As a result, domains that deploy new ciphers may in fact cause the resolvers not to validate DNSSEC. We exploit this to develop DNSSEC-downgrade attacks and experimentally and ethically evaluate them against popular DNS resolver implementations, public DNS providers, and DNS services used by web clients worldwide. We find that major DNS providers as well as 45% of DNS resolvers used by web clients are vulnerable to our attacks.
Year
DOI
Venue
2022
10.1145/3548606.3563517
Computer and Communications Security
DocType
Citations 
PageRank 
Conference
0
0.34
References 
Authors
0
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Elias Heftrig101.35
Haya Shulman229337.26
Michael Waidner33877395.65