Title
Cooperation and game-theoretic cost allocation in stochastic inventory models with continuous review.
Abstract
•We model two companies that continuously review inventories and face Poisson demand.•Two cooperation strategies for joint replenishment are studied.•Replenish when a company reaches its reorder level, has the lowest cost, numerically.•The Shapley value and the distribution rule are stable cost allocations.•These results also hold for three companies.
Year
DOI
Venue
2013
10.1016/j.ejor.2013.05.051
European Journal of Operational Research
Keywords
Field
DocType
Joint replenishment,Stochastic demand,Cost allocation,Continuous review,Game theory,Inventory model
Economics,Incentive,Shapley value,Microeconomics,Game theoretic,Corporate group,Game theory,Procurement,Cost allocation,Operations management
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
231
3
0377-2217
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
6
0.51
2
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Judith Timmer110115.67
Michela Chessa2101.91
Richard J. Boucherie331137.73