Name
Title | ||
|---|---|---|
Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized |
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem on the manipulability of social-choice rules assumes resoluteness: there are no ties, no multi-member choice sets. Generalizations based on a familiar lottery idea allow ties but assume perfectly
shared probabilistic beliefs about their resolution. We prove a more straightforward generalization that assumes almost no
limit on ties or beliefs about them. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2000 | 10.1007/PL00007177 | Social Choice and Welfare |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Straightforward Generalization,Shared Belief,Probabilistic Belief,Strategic Manipulability | Welfare economics,Mathematical economics,Economics,Generalization,Lottery,Probabilistic logic | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
17 | 1 | 0176-1714 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
63 | 49.47 | 1 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| John Duggan | 1 | 241 | 145.72 |
| Thomas Schwartz | 2 | 70 | 51.55 |