Paper Info
Title
Core concepts for share vectors
Abstract
.   A value mapping for cooperative games with transferable utilities is a mapping that assigns to every game a set of vectors each representing a distribution of the payoffs. A value mapping is efficient if to every game it assigns a set of vectors which components all sum up to the worth that can be obtained by all players cooperating together.¶ An approach to efficiently allocate the worth of the ‘grand coalition’ is using share mappings which assign to every game a set of share vectors being vectors which components sum up to one. Every component of a share vector is the corresponding players' share in the total payoff that is to be distributed among the players. In this paper we discuss a class of share mappings containing the (Shapley) share-core, the Banzhaf share-core and the Large Banzhaf share-core, and provide characterizations of this class of share mappings.
Year
DOI
Venue
2001
10.1007/s003550000083
Social Choice and Welfare
Keywords
Field
DocType
Cooperative Game,Core Concept,Grand Coalition,Total Payoff,Share Mapping
Mathematical economics,Finite set,Repeated game,Information set,Game tree,Non-cooperative game,Example of a game without a value,Mathematics,Outcome (game theory),Stochastic game
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
18
4
0176-1714
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
4
0.73
0
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
René Van Den Brink118727.06
Gerard Van Der Laan214824.79