Title
Last-Level Cache Side-Channel Attacks are Practical
Abstract
We present an effective implementation of the Prime Probe side-channel attack against the last-level cache. We measure the capacity of the covert channel the attack creates and demonstrate a cross-core, cross-VM attack on multiple versions of GnuPG. Our technique achieves a high attack resolution without relying on weaknesses in the OS or virtual machine monitor or on sharing memory between attacker and victim.
Year
DOI
Venue
2015
10.1109/SP.2015.43
IEEE Symposiumon Security and Privacy
Keywords
Field
DocType
Side-channel attack, cross-VM side channel, covert channel, last-level cache, ElGamal
Watermarking attack,Internet privacy,Computer security,Cryptography,Cache,Computer science,Covert channel,Computer network,Pre-play attack,Timing attack,Side channel attack,Ciphertext-only attack
Conference
ISSN
Citations 
PageRank 
1081-6011
223
5.34
References 
Authors
32
5
Search Limit
100223
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Fangfei Liu133612.31
Yuval Yarom277535.54
Qian Ge33159.40
Gernot Heiser42525137.42
Ruby Lee52460261.28