Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Fault attacks consist in changing the program behavior by injecting faults at run-time, either at hardware or at software level. Their goal is to change the correct progress of the algorithm and hence, either to allow gaining some privilege access or to allow retrieving some secret information based on an analysis of the deviation of the corrupted behavior with respect to the original one. Countermeasures have been proposed to protect embedded systems by adding spatial, temporal or information redundancy at hardware or software level. First we define Countermeasures Check Point (CCP) and CCPs-based countermeasures as an important subclass of countermeasures. Then we propose a methodology to generate an optimal protection scheme for CCPs-based countermeasure. Finally we evaluate our work on a benchmark of code examples with respect to several Control Flow Integrity (CFI) oriented existing protection schemes. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2020 | 10.1109/FDTC51366.2020.00011 | 2020 Workshop on Fault Detection and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC) |
Keywords | DocType | ISBN |
multiple fault-injection,code analysis,counter-measures optimization,dynamic-symbolic execution | Conference | 978-1-7281-9563-6 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 15 |
Authors | ||
4 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Etienne Boespflug | 1 | 0 | 0.34 |
| Cristian Ene | 2 | 0 | 0.34 |
| Laurent Mounier | 3 | 1187 | 79.54 |
| Marie-Laure Potet | 4 | 190 | 21.34 |